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Summary  findings
Directed credit programs were a major tool of  *  Credit programs must be financed by long-term
development in the  1960s and  1970s. In the 1980s, their  funds to prevent inflation and macroeconomic instabilitv.
usefulness was reconsidered. Experience in most  Recourse to central bank credit should be avoided except
countries showed that they stimulated capital-intensive  in the very early stages of development when the central
projects, that preferential funds were often (mis)used for  bank's assistance can help jump-start economic growth.
nonpriority  purposes, that a decline in financial  * They should aim at achieving positive externalities
discipline led to low repayment rates, and that budget  (or avoiding negative ones).  Any help to declining
deficits swelled. Moreover, the programs were hard to  industries should include plans for their timely phaseour.
remove.  * They should promote  industrialization and export
But Japan and other East Asian countries have long  orientation  in a competitive private sector with
touted the merits of focused, well-managed directed  internationally competitive operations.
credit programs, saying they are warranted when there is  * They should be part of a credible vision of economic
a significant discrepancy between private and social  development that promotes growth with equity and
benefits, when investment risk is too high on certain  should involve a long-term strategy to develop a sound
projects, and when information problems discourage  financial system.
lending to small and medium-size firms. The assumption  *  Policy-based loans should be channeled through
underlying policy-based assistance and other forms of  well-capitalized, administratively capable financial
industrial assistance (such as lower taxes) is that the main  institutions, professionally managed by autonomous
constraint on new or expanding enterprises is limited  managers.
access to credit.  - They should be based on clear, objective, easily
Vittas and Cho give an overview of credit policies in  monitorable criteria.
East Asian countries (China, Japan, and the Republic of  - Programs should aim for a good repayment record
Korea) as well as India, and summarize what these  and few losses.
countries have learned about directed credit programs.  - They should be supported  by effective mechanisms
Among the lessons:  for communication and consultation between the public
* Credit programs must be small, narrowly focused,  and private sectors, including the collection and
and of limited duration  (with clear sunset provisions).  dissemination of basic market information.
* Subsidies must be low to minimize distortion  of
incentives as well as the tax on financial intermediation
that all such programs entail.
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CREDIT  POLICIES:  LESSONS  FROM  EAST ASIA
Dimitri Vittas and Yoon Je ChoI.  INTRODUCTION
Directed credit programs involving  loans on preferential  terms and conditions  to priority sectors
were a major tool of development  policy in both developed  and developing  countries in the 1960s  and
1970s. During  the 1980s,  the realization  that most of these  programs had resulted in distorted  incentives
among both lenders and borrowers led to a reconsideration  of their rationale and effectiveness. The
experience  of most countries  around the world showed  that directed credit programs stimulated  capital
intensive projects, suffered from abuse and misuse of preferential funds for nonpriority purposes,
increased  the cost of funds to nonpreferential  borrowers, involved  a decline in financial discipline  that
resulted in low repayment  rates, and contributed  to a swelling of budget deficits.  Moreover, once
introduced, directed credit programs  proved difficult  to remove.
This general assessment  of the adverse  effects  of directed  credit programs  has contrasted  with the
experience and views of government  officials in Japan and other East Asian countries who have long
advocated  the merits of well managed and focused directed credit programs.  According  to this view,
government  involvement  in directing  credit is warranted  when there is a significant  discrepancy  between
private and social benefits, when the investment  risk of particular projects is too high, and when
information  problems  discourage  lending  to small and medium  size firms.  Use of policy-based  lending,
in addition to other forms of industrial assistance  (e.g. lower taxes, grants, etc), is premised on the
argument  that the main constraint  facing  new or expanding  enterprises  is their limited access  to external
finance  at reasonable  terms and conditions. Directed  credit  programs  involving  small subsidies  overcome
this constraint, but to avoid the misuse of funds and abuse of credit programs, a strong emphasis  must
be placed on the maintenance  of macroeconomic  stability  to minimize distortions in incentives  and on
effective  monitoring  to ensure the timely repayment  of loans.
This paper provides  a brief overview  of credit policies  in East  Asian countries  (Japan, Korea and
China)' as well as India  and attempts  to pull together  some lessons  from the experience  of these  countries.
It draws  on the findings  of a World  Bank research  project on the "Effectiveness  of Credit Policies in East
",2 Asian Countries
I  But the paper's main focus is on Japan and Korea.
2  The project consists of four parts: this overview  paper; two conceptual  papers on the case for
credit policies  and the role of government  in overcoming  market imperfections;  a series of country  papers
on policy-based  lending,  financial  sector  development  and industrialization  including  very detailed  studies
of policy-based  finance in postwar Japan and Korea; and empirical work using a large sample of firm-
level data on the effectiveness  of credit policies in Japan.
IThis project is part of the response  of the World Bank  to the issues  raised by Japanese  and other
East  Asian  officials  regarding the  appropriateness of  government intervention in  stimulating
industrialization  and economic  development 3.
It focuses on the role of government  in the financial sector and seeks to establish under what
conditions can government interventions make a  positive contribution to  economic growth and
development. It also discusses  the replicability  of East Asian experience  in other developing  countries.
The second section discusses the theoretical underpinnings of policy-based finance and suggests a
framework in which this study attempts to inyestigate the role of government.  The third section
introduces  the main findings of individual  country studies (Japan, Korea, China and India), while the
fourth section analyzes  the similarities  and differences  in the credit polices among these countries in a
comparative  perspective. The final section briefly summarizes  and concludes  the paper.
-'  This project is complementary  to the "East Asian Miracle" project (World Bank 1993) and, in
a less direct way, to the project on the "Main Bank System of Japan", sponsored by the Economic
Development  Institute. All three projects  have received  generous  support  from the Government  of Japan
and have relied extensively  on inputs and contributions  form Japanese  and other East Asian officials,
economists and practitioners.  The paper also draws on the 1989 World Development  Report on
"Financial  Systems  anJ Development"  (World Bank 1989).
2II.  THEORETICAL  UNDERPINNINGS OF POLICY-BASED LENDING  4
In a world  of  "perfect and  costless"  information,  the role of the financial system  is passive:
finance is  provided  to  the projects  that yield  the highest  returns.  There  is  little scope  for  activist
involvement by either governments or financial institutions for improving the allocation of credit.  In the
real world, however,  information is highly "imperfect" and costly.  The allocation of credit suffers from
the existence of informational asymmetries, from the costs of monitoring and verification, and from the
costs of contract enforcement.  Under these conditions, credit is not necessarily allocated to its best use.
Informational asymmetries give rise to problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, free riding
and incentive incompatibility.  Asymmetric information problems are further compounded by uncertainty
about project returns and by the existence of dynamic externalities.  These support a greater involvement
ot governments  and financial institutions in the allocation of credit,  although the information problems
that inhibit the functioning of markets also constrain the ability of governments and financial institutions
to enhance  efficiency  in the allocation of credit.  The information problems  that cause markets to  be
imperfect also cause financial intermediaries (whether privately or publicly owned) and governments to
be imperfect.
Economic  theory  has  made  considerable  progress  in  recent  years  in  understanding  these
phenomena and has bridged the wide gap that used to exist between theory and practice.  For instance,
economic theory stresses the role of market imperfections in explaining the reliance of firms on internally
generated funds (retained earnings) as well as on other forms of so-called "inside" finance, i.e.  finance
provided by owners, managers and banks that have access to information that is not available in the public
domain.  Such reliance is especially pronounced for young growing firms and for new industrial sectors
in developing countries and is clearly a factor constraining their growth.  "Inside" finance is less costly
than "outside" finance.  Increases in available "inside" finance reduce the marginal cost or premium  of
outside funds.
In the absence of full information,  banks tend to allocate credit to firms with available internal
funds or with a reliable track record even if they are not the ones with the best investment opportunities.
Financial  intermediaries,  especially  (but not only) commercial  banks,  can  play  an important  role  in
screening projects,  monitoring behavior, verifying outcomes, managing corporate distress and resolving
agency problems.  By developing and maintaining close long-term relationships with their customers,
commercial banks can have superior information to that of outsiders, can support expansion plans,  and
can also reduce the costs of corporate distress.
4  This section draws on Calomiris et al (1992) and Calomiris and Himmelberg (1994a and 1994b),
which also contain detailed references to the academic debate on theoretical issues.
3These potential advant&ges  of banks depend on the behavior  of bankers and the incentives  and
regulations that govern their operations. In many countries, especially  those suffering from substantial
gaps in information  disclosure  on corporate  performance,  but also even in countries without  such major
shortcomings  such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Scandinavian  countries, commercial
banks tend to favor lending  for low risk activities,  such as self-liquidating  short-term  working  capital and
trade finance, or for high risk but more speculative  projects with short payback periods, such as real
estate development. Commercial  banks are generally  less willing to finance more risky projects with
longer payback  periods even if they may have higher overall returns.  They are also generally  reluctant
to finance small firms without  adequate  collateral, even though  such firms may be more innovative  and
may promise higher returns.
A government role in the allocation of credit can be justified on one of two grounds.  One
justification for the use of credit programs is as a preferred or superior industrial  policy instrument  for
reaping  positive externalities 5. Other forms of industrial  policy tools, such as tariffs and subsidies, rely
on the marginal incentives  faced by firms and may be less effective  if firms face binding  external  finance
constraints.
A second possible motivation for credit programs comes from the comparative  advantage  the
government  may enjoy in credit supply. Government  agencies  (often in direct collaboration  with private
sector industrial  associations  and research  institutes)  may have  superior information  on sectoral  prospects
than individual  private firms and may therefore  have an advantage  in screening  projects. (The so-called
cowbell  or signalling  effect would  depend on such superior information,  which may also be linked to an
implicit or explicit insurance  provided  by the government.) Governments  may further have advantages
in monitoring  behavior  and verifying  outcomes,  although  this would  depend  on the  relative  organizational
efficiency  of government  entities  vis-a-vis  financial  intermediaries.  Governments  are likely to have lower
costs of enforcing  contracts  through taxation  and police  powers. The government's  taxation  powers  may
be very important  in internalizing  benefits  from certain  lending  policies,  which  private intermediaries  may
be unable to capture.  This advantage  gains in importance  if there are technological  spillover effects,
which neither the firm nor its intermediary  can capture  but which  can be internalized  by the governmnent's
claims on future taxes.
The presence of these advantages from government involvement in finance depends on the
efficiency  and motivation  of governments. Governments  do not always "do the right thing" even if they
have some comparative  advantage. Government  involvement  in credit allocation  often results in rent
seeking, corruption, and crowding out,  rather than the pursuit of efficient industrial projects.  An
important issue in the study of policy-based lending is how can governments  prevent rent-seeking
behavior from undermining  the growth objectives  of government  policies.
5  Externalities  used to be dismissed  by theoretical  economists  in the 1970s  but in recent years there
has been a fundamental  re-assessment  of their role.
4Externalities,  information  problems  and uncertainty  are the main  justifications  used by Japanese
and Korean policy makers in support of government  intervention  in the allocation  of credit.  The view
of the Japanese Overseas Economic Cooperation  Fund (OECF) is that subsidized interest rates and
directed credit programs may be called  for in the following  cases (OECF 1991):
*  When the investment  risk is too high regarding  a particular activity (owing to the need
for large scale, long gestation  period, high technology  and market development);
*  When  there is significant  discrepancy  between  private and social  benefits  (e.g. in the case
of rural industries that increase job  opportunities in  rural areas and prevent over-
concentration  in urban regions, in the case of industries  or parts of industries  that may
save foreign exchange and thus relieve the balance of payments constraint on other
growth industries, or in the case of investment  for pollution control and environment
protection);
*  When  information  problems  discourage  lending  to small  and medium  scale  industries;  and
*  When infant industries  face large social set-up costs.
The OECF view is that the use of subsidized interest rates and credit intervention are not
inherently inferior to providing  subsidies  through the budget.
Government  intervention  may be justified by the externalities  and information  problems  afflicting
credit markets, but the question  arises as to how and in what circumstance  can these positive aspects  of
government  intervention  be fully  realized. As already  noted,  experience  with credit  policies  varies widely
among  different countries. In Japan and Korea, government  intervention  in credit markets is deemed to
have been effective  and beneficial  for growth and development. But in the vast majority of developing
countries, credit policies have given  rise to severe  market distortions  and have failed to promote growth
and development. Most studies of credit policies focus on the size of credit programs, the level of
interest rates, and especially  the level of subsidies.
But focusing  too narrowly on these aspects  of credit policies may be misleading. In many  cases,
government  influence  over credit allocation  could be much  stronger even  though interest rates are mildly
repressed in real terms, and the size of explicitly  labeled selective  credit programs is relatively small.
For example,  Japan avoided  highly  negative  real interest  rates, and  had relatively  small (explicitly  labeled)
directed credit programs compared to many other developing countries during its early period of
economic  development. Nevertheless,  this did not necessary  mean that the role of government  in credit
allocation in Japan was less significant than that in other countries, where interest rates were more
severely repressed due to large fiscal deficits.  In Japan, policy-based finance was combined with
extensive financial regulation  in creating a rigidly segmented  financial  system that favored lending to
5industry and discouraged  lending for  speculative purposes,  real estate develpopment,  or consumption
(Vittas and Kawaura 1994).  Similarly, one may not assess the degree of  government intervention in a
country over time by simply looking at the level of real interest rates.  For example, Korea doubled the
level of interest rates, yielding highly positive real rates in 1965, which was often interpreted as financial
liberalization.  But in fact this strengthened the role of government in credit allocation by shifting funds
from the unregulated  curb market to the banks which came under  stronger  control of the government
(Cho and Kim  1994).
A very important, yet often neglected, aspect has to do with the "management of credit policies".
The performance  of firms,  although employing the same input mix and producing  the same kinds of
product,  may be widely different depending on the effectiveness of management.  Similarly, good  and
bad governance and gocd and bad policy implementation can make a lot of difference to the impart of
credit and other economic policies.  While economists have recognized that there  are some merits for
government intervention in certain areas, they have often compared these market failures to a simplistic
notion of government failure.  What needs to be studied is precisely what contributes to "good economic
management" and "good policy implementation. " Good management, even for an economy, is not always
least management or least intervention.  It requires effective incentive schemes to motivate the members
of the organization, and close monitoring of their performance.  Government control over credit may also
be understood in the light of governance structures.  Credit allocation was used as a powerful instrument
for governance control over industrial firms in Korea, and to a lesser extent, in Japan.
The effectiveness of credit policy management, or more broadly effective economic management,
would require a supportive institutional environment.  The main purpose of credit policy is to overcome
market  imperfections but to be effective this requires close consultation and  coordination between  the
government  and the business sector and a close and effective monitoring and enforcement mechanism.
The impact of credit  policies often depends on whether an economy has such a supportive institutional
environment  and  well  functioning mechanisms for  close and effective consultation,  coordination  and
monitoring.
The role of government and the merit of government intervention should also be understood in
a dynamic context.  In the early stage of development, when many markets are missing,  and the existing
markets are highly imperfect, and when private sector institutions are poorly developed, the government
can play an important role in overcoming some of these problems.  But in the later stages of economic
development, when the private industrial sector becomes more sophisticated and markets are more robust
and better developed,  the merits of government intervention diminish significantly.
6III.  COUNTRY EXPERIENCES: MAIN FINDINGS
A.  CREDIT POLICY  IN JAPAN 6
1.  Basic Objectives
Japanese  credit and industrial  policy has evolved  over time in response  to the changing  needs and
structure of the economy. Three phases are usually identified:
*  The reconstructiori  period between 1945 and 1955 when industrial policy and direct
government  allocation  of funds  were very important.
*  The period of high growth  between 1955  and 1973  when government  policy operated in
a less direct fashion, although  the financial  system was rigidly segmented  and subject to
wide-ranging  controls.
*  The period since the mid-1970s  when credit policy has become less interventionist  and
a slow but steady process  of financial  liberalization  has been under way.
During the high growth era the Japanese  financial  system  had a number  of features  that, though
not unique to it, combined together to give it a character that was quite distinct from that of Anglo-
American or continental  European  financial  systems. These features included  the preponderant  role of
indirect finance, the "overloan"  position of the large city banks (i.e. their reliance on credits from the
Bank of Japan for funding  their loans to industrial  corporations),  the "overborrowing"  or high leverage
of industrial companies,  and the artificially  low level of interest rates (Suzuki 1980)7. Other distinctive
features of the Japanese  financial system included  the role played by the main bank system, the close
relations between banks and industry, the different roles  .played by debt and equity in the Japanese
financial system, and the important  financial intermediary  role played by large conglomerate  groups,
especially  the general  trading companies,  'in  channelling  funds  to small firms at the periphery  of different
groups.  The financial sector of Japan in the high-growth  era was highly  segmented. This conferred  to
the authorities  greater control  over the allocation  of financial  resources, although  the Japanese  authorities
did not impose strict directed  credit programs on private financial  institutions.
The Japanese  credit (and industrial)  policy seems to have aimed at four different objectives:
6  This section draws on JDB/JER1  (1994), Vittas and Kawaura (1994), and Vittas and Wang
(1991).
7  The alleged  uniqueness  of these characteristics  has been challenged  by some analysts  (Horiuchi
1984, Ikeo 1987, and Kuroda and,Oritani 1980).
7*  To pick and support  "winning" industries, especially in areas where Japan could enjoy
a dynamic comparative advantage;
*  To phase out "losing" industries, i.e. to help the restructuring and reduction of capacity
of those declining industries where Japan was no longer internationally competitive;
*  To support small scale firms; and
*  To provide the necessary industrial infrastructure.
The extensive financial support for some traditional and relatively inefficient industries, such as
agriculture,  could be seen more as a social policy objective or a response to political pressures and less
as a component of an active industrial policy.  Government regulation and intervention in the financial
sector,  through  MITI,  the Ministry  of Finance  (MOF),  or  the Bank of Japan  (BOJ),  did not  focus
exclusively on securing cheap finance for the most dynamic sectors,  but appeared to aim for a balance
between the claims of different sectors.
2.  Changing Focus of Industrial Policies and Policy-Based Finance
Industrial  policies  in postwar  Japan  have  evolved  steadily over  four decades,  from  an early
emphasis on individual industries to a recent emphasis on policies that cross  industrial boundaries:
*  1950s: policies for developing and fostering industry (expansion of capacity);
*  1960s: policies for strengthening the competitiveness of industry in the face of trade and
capital liberalization (modernization and technological upgrading);
*  1970s: policies  for  enabling  industry  to  adjust  to  changes  caused  by  the  oil  crises
(restructuring  both at the company and industry levels);
*  1980s: policies  for  promoting  diversified  targets  such as technology  and  information
network (diversification of industrial structure).
The  most distinct  element  of Japan's  industrial  policy has  been the  cooperative  relationship
between government and industry,  each of which recognized the necessity of striving toward common
goals.  This  relationship  has been  reflected most  clearly  in emergence  of  the  "deliberative  council
system."  The councils have provided the public and private sectors with a forum for coordinating.  They
had been well established by the  1960s, when almost all important industrial policies were decided by
their respective councils.  These councils were formed with industry representatives,  former bureaucrats,
academics,  and others,  thus ensuring  that  the broadest  range of interest  could be captured  and  then
8synthesized  into a policy directive. Without a council reaching a consensus,  it is unlikely that policy
would materialize as intended.
Industrial  policies  consisted  of direct regulations  (special  legislation  and administrative  guidance)
and indirect measures  (infrastructural  development,  taxation, subsidies, and policy-based  finance).  In
Japan, these tools were selected  by government  ministries  either as sole policy instruments  or more likely
as part of a policy mix.  In postwar  Japan, policy-based  finance formed  an indispensable  element  of any
policy mix, due largely to its distinct characteristics  -- its discretion in selecting  projects, its flexibility
to respond to changes  in policy priorities and objectives,  and its pump-priming  and cow-bell  roles.
3.  The Reconstruction  Finance  Bank and the Priority  Production  System
In the immediate  postwar period, the Reconstruction  Finance  Bank (RFB)  was created  to provide
finance to priority industries. It accounted  for 84% of the total funding for capital investment  and 16%
of the working capital needs of major industries such as coal, iron and steel, electric power, ocean
shipping, fertilizers and textiles. Its contribution  to the total financing  needs of these sectors amounted
to 44% of the total funds provided  by all financial  institutions. In particular, RFB covered 71% of the
total financing needs of the coal mining industry, 88% of electric power, and 66% of ocean shipping 8.
Financing  from RFB facilitated  the recovery  of production  of these high priority sectors and paved the
way for the economic  recovery of Japan during the reconstruction  period.
RFB was, however, funded by issuing bonds that were underwritten  by the Bank of Japan and
this fueled inflation. In fact, the high inflation  meant that the fixed interest rates on the loans provided
to firms in the priority sectors  became  highly  negative. The loss of control  over inflation,  combined  with
a high occurrence of delinquent  loans and some financial scandals  that damaged  the reputation  of the
RFB, led the Japanese  authorities  to suspend  the operations  of RFB in 1949  when the Dodge Line plan
for economic  stabilization  was implemented. The Dodge  Line plan aimed to achieve  a super-balanced
budget and also established a unified and stable exchange  rate.  The policy caused a major economic
recession,  reductions  in exports and investment,  company  closures, suspension  and production  cuts, and
even personnel  cuts9.
8  Its funding of the iron and steel industry was only 16%, mainly because this sector borrowed
mostly for working capital  purposes in that period.  RFB accounted  for 69% of the sector's borrowing
for equipment  purposes.
9  The experience of Japan in the late 1940s suggests that Japan was an early example of a
successful  transition from a war-torn, centrally  planned and directed military economy into a market-
based industrial economy as well as an equally early and successful example of macroeconomic
adjustment  and restructuring.
9Successful  implementation  of the Dodge  Line  plan imposed  fiscal  balance,  removed  price controls
and contained monetary expansion.  The policy was followed by deflation, but created the stable
macroeconomic  environment for the successful implementation  in subsequent years of policy-based
lending and other industrial policies for the rationalization  and modernization  of the Japanese industry.
4.  The Fiscal Investment  and Loan Program
The Japanese authorities established  policy-based financial institutions in the early 1950s to
provide funding for industrial investment, housing and other purposes.  To avoid the inflationary
implications of financing these activities through monetary creation, policy-based institutions were
financed with resources collected through the extensive postal savings and annuities network and
channelled  through the Trust Fund Bureau.  as part of the Fiscal Investment  and Loan Program.
The FILP amounted to 4% of GNP in the 1950s, increased to 5% in the mid to late 1960s,
fluctuated between 6.5% and 7.5% for most of the 1970s  and 1980s, and exceeded  8% in the early
1990s. The rise reflects the increasing  importance  of postal  savings  funds. With regard to total lending
by the financial  system,  policy-based  finance  accounted  for 13  % of the total in the mid-1950s,  fell to 10%
in the 1960s,  but rose to 15% in the 1970s  and 1980s,  before  declining  again to 12% in the early 1990s.
FILP funds have increasingly  been used over the years for social (or at least, nonindustrial)
purposes, especially  for the financing  of housing. Their share in the supply  of new industrial  equipment
funds  fell from around 30% in the mid-1950s  to 20% for most of the ensuing  two decades  and to around
12% in recent years.
Policy-based  finance guided the financial  resources  of the government  and private finance into
areas that were most desirable from the view of the national economy.  To  function effectively,
policy-based  financial  institutions  often provided  loan conditions  that were more favorable  than those of
private finance.  The most favorable interest rate offered by policy-based  financial institutions at the
beginning of the  1950s was lower than the private-sector long-term prime rate by 3.5%; the least
favorable  was the same as the prime rate. In addition,  policy-based  loans were provided  for much longer
maturities  (up to 12  years) and were also free  of compensating  balances  that often  increased  substantially
the cost of private finance, especially  for smaller firms.  Although  policy-based  loans continued  to be
provided  at fixed  rates of interest, success  in maintaining  macroeconomic  and price stability  avoided  the
occurrence  of highly  negative  interest rates  that bedeviled  the RFB operations  (as well  as preferential  loan
programs in most LDCs).
Policy-based finance was considered to be superior to loan guarantees by private financial
institutions. The first problem  with loan  guarantees  was that private  financial  institutions  mav make  loans
too casually if they are able to shlift  all the risk to the government. Second, a guarantee  fee may weaken
the effectiveness  of the interest rate aspect  of policy-based  guidance. Third, allowing  private financial
10institutions  to identify and select loan projects autonomously  makes it difficult  to ensure that policy is
applied comprehensively  and fairly.
5.  The Operations  of the Japan Development  Bank
I
JDB initially targeted  its financing  at basic industries  (electric  power, iron and steel, coal, and
ocean  shipping)  in which  plants and machinery  were obsolete,  and whose  products and services  comprised
a large share of the cost component  of other industries. Modernizing  these industries  with expansionary
investment  to crack production  bottlenecks  was indispensable  for increasing  exports, sustaining  economic
growth, and upgrading  other industries. At the same time, JDB was instrumental  in introducing  foreign
capital through World Bank loans and serving as the guarantor  for private-sector  foreign currency  loans.
In the mid-1950s, lending areas diversified into infant industries, such as machinery, and new
industries, such as petrochemicals. JDB lending to these industries was key toward guiding private
financing.
At the outset of the high growth period of the 1960s,  JDB began targeting its funding at areas
to address the effects of trade liberalization  and regional disparities --this in response to the shifting
objectives  of the Japanese  economy. In 1961,  as it diversified  its funding  procurement,  JDB also issued
foreign  currency bonds, playing a pioneering  role in introducing  foreign  capital.
At its inception, the JDB learned several lessons from the RFB.  Although the RFB was in a
sense the predecessor  of the JDB, it did tiot share JDB's managerial  independence. Lending  decisions
were made beyond the purview of the RFB, and they were not necessarily based on solid appraisal
criteria. But the government  assured  the first governor  of JDB that he would  not have  to bend to political
pressure for nonviable  projects. The JDB also established  a capable loan appraisal department. Thus,
loan  decisions  were left to the professional  judgment  of JDB staff and officials, while  the government  was
responsible  for establishing  the basic  policy  for the operation  of funds  annually. JDB verified  how project
funds  were spent and assessed  their impact. A government  auditor also conducted  regular annual  audits.
Thus, a system of multiple checks  prevented  the inappropriate  or illegal application  of the funds from
policy-based  financing. This overall framework  enabled  JDB to keep its loan  losses  at a much  lower level
than that of the private financial  sector. JDB made relatively  few mistakes in selecting  loan projects.
At the  time of JDB's establishment,  the equity  capital  contribution  from the government  accounted
for a substantial  portion of its total funds. Further, as the accumulation  of statutory reserves increased
in proportion  to increases  in its loan balance,  JDB's financial  composition  continued  to be favorable. As
such, it could offer a preferential  interest rate in line with policy demands,  without  being subsidized  by
public finance. Its strong financial  position also guaranteed  its managerial  independence.
116.  Project Appraisal, Effective Mbnitoring and Low Loan Losses
An important aspect of the operation of directed credit programs that separates the experience of
Japan from that of most other developing countries is the quality of appraisal and effective monitoring
of projects.  These ensured that funds were lent to creditworthy projects and were utilized for the purpose
for which they were obtained.  The result was a high level of loan repayment and a correspondingly low
level of loan losses.
In Japan,  loan approval was based on a very detailed appraisal of the projects to be financed and
an evaluation of the history and character of the firm involved.  The aim was to ascertain the ability of
the borrowers to repay their loans.  Independent and powerful appraisal departments were established and
these were organizationally separate from loan departments.  Once projects were approved, no payments
were  made  without  adequate  documentation,  while  close  cooperation  between  development  and
commercial  banks  ensured  continuous  monitoring  of  the  performance  of  borrowers  and  allowed
development banks to take early action if loan repayment was in arrears.  The overall economic success
of Japan also meant that most borrowers made substantial profits and had little difficulty in repaying their
loans.
Effective pre-appraisal and monitoring resulted in very low loan losses for the Japan Development
Bank (JDB) which experienced write-offs of 0.09% of average loans outstanding in the period 1951-55
and  of only 0.01%  in the period  1956-65.  In fact, despite its specialization in  long-term  industrial
finance, JDB experienced during the high growth era a much lower level of loan losses than commercial
and trust banks that focused more on short-term loans and had a more diversified  loan portfolio'".  The
superior performance of JDB may partly be explained by its greater reliance on collateral security.  This
was related to the greater utilization of JDB loans for the acquisition of equipment.  But the existence of
collateral  security provided an additional incentive to firms to repay their loans.
7.  Industry Case Studies: The Application of Policy Measures and Funding
Four  industries  illustrate  how  policy-based finance was combined with  industrial  policies  to
address different stages of industrial development.
For the machine industry (an infant industry), the government established a special  law, and
sought to modernize the sector by promoting  the renovation of obsolete facilities and the accumulation
of capital and technology.  It sought to establish machine-specific rationalization plans and arranged for
'°  Firmns  in declining sectors, such as coal mining and, later, shipbuilding, were often unable to meet
their loan obligations.  It seems that in Japan, some of the losses of these companies were transferred to
the government and absorbed by the general budget.  This may explain the unusually low level of loan
losses, not only by the JDB, but also by most commercial banks.
12JDB funding. Particularly  noteworthy  was funding  to subsectors  of machine  tools and automobile  parts
and the  guidance  offered  to guided  private  financial  institutions  toward  these  emerging  machine  industries.
For the shipbuilding industry (an export industry),  the loss of its international  market after the
war was considerable. However, orders for export ships increased after 1950, triggered by a global
shipping shortage.  To promote exports, the government  provided special tax deductions for income
earned by exports, established an export insurance system, and arranged for long-term, low-interest
deferred payment financed  by the Export Import Bank of Japan (EIBJ). From 1950 to the early part of
the 1960s, EIBJ financing  for export liners accounted  for a considerable  share of its operations. This
financing largely benefitted  the shipbuilding  industry, and enabled it to become the principal foreign
exchange earner in the late 1950s. (It was only 20 years later that the shipbuilding  industry, once so
conspicuously  dominant in the world market, had to undergo extensive  restructuring in the face of the
worldwide  depression  and the extensive  changes  in the industrial structure of Japan.)
The iron and steel industry (a basic industry) was the core of the postwar Priority Production
System and the target of various policy tools -- including  the priority distribution of coal input, RFB
financing,  and price-support  subsidies. The preferential  status of the industry continued  throughout  the
1950s. The tools used to promote the rationalization  of the industry included JDB financing, special
accelerated  depreciation  allowances,  tariff exemptions  on important  machinery,  and the priority allocation
of foreign  currency  for introducing  technology. JDB provided  13  % of the funding  for capital  investments
under the First Rationalization  Plan between 1951 and 1955. During the Second Rationalization  Plan
(from 1956  to 1960)  JDB served as the "window"  through which loans were borrowed from the World
Bank.
Japan's coal mining industry (a declining industry), also a core component of the postwar
Priority Production  System, fell into a structural slump following  the remarkable  energy revolution of
the mid-1950s. Government  support measures and efforts by the industry could not stop its ultimate
decline. Thus, in 1962  the rationalization  policies  shifted  to alleviating  the social  friction precipitated  by
the closure  of some coal mines. JDB supplied  rationalization  funds  to highly  efficient  mines in an effort
to concentrate production  in these mines.  In addition, the government  provided subsidies for interest
payments, mediated  the reemployment  of those who lost their jobs, and formulated  policies to facilitate
locating  other industries in coal-producing  regions.
8.  Behind  the Good Performance  of Policy-Based  Finance
Given that the policy-based  financial system in Japan (particularly  JDB) was instrumental in
spurring high economic  growth in the  postwar  period, an understanding  of factors  and background  which
made this system function effectively is extremely valuable for other countries that are considering
establishing policy-based financial systems.  Three characteristics  of the Japanese system are most
notable.
13The first is a respect  for the market  economy. A precondition  for a policy-based  finance  system
is the existence  of a private sector business  structure and private finance  that can be supplemented  with
policy-based  finance.  In Japan's case, its prewar experience  as a market economy  and its endeavor to
establish  postwar  economic  reform  created  an environment  that fostered  an entrepreneurial  spirit among
the private sector.  I
The second characteristic  (which became  particularly  evident  in Japan as the high growth period
unfolded) is the close relationship between the government's  econoniic plans and policy-based
finance. Through  policy-based  finance,  the priority allocation  of financing  was implemented  in line with
government  policies  that incorporated  the will  of the private  sector. The precondition  for this relationship
was the existence  of a public savings  system, and a vehicle  fpr allocating  funds efficiently  -- that is, the
Fiscal Investment  and Loan Program
The third characteristic  (particularly  relevant  to JDB) is a respect  for managerial  independence
given the existence of a  sound financial composition and management.  While JDB had inherent
limitations  as a government-related  financial  institution,  its neutral and fair appraisal  basp enabled it to
make funding decisions  autonomously.
B.  EMPIRICAL  EVALUATION  OF CREDIT  POLICY  IN JAPAN"
A successful  implementation  of credit policies would show the following  characteristics:
Financial  support to successful,  dynamic industries  would decline  over time since as a
result of their very success, such industries  would be expected  to repay their loans and
achieve  financial  independence.  Even if successful  companies  might continue  to rely on
bank loans for financing  their expansion  plans, they would presumably  cease to receive
support from government  funds.
Financial  support to declining  industries  would  probably  last for longer  periods. A basic
objective  of policy  would be to smooth  the adjustment  process and reduce  capacity  in an
orderly fashion in  order  to  minimize dislocations in  labor markets and  regional
economies. Thus, the provision  of government  financial  support would likely delay the
adjustment,  but whether  this would be econ,mically  beneficial  or not would depend on
the balance  between  the benefits  and costs involved.
Financial  support  to growing  firms would  be more permanent  and would not be affected
by the fortunes of particular industrial  sectors.  However, successful  firms would not
This section  draws on Calomiris  et al (1992)  and Calomiris  and Himmelberg  (1994a and 1994b).
14only grow into larger units, but would also reduce their reliance on government financial
support.
*  Finally,  financial  support  for  industrial  infrastructure  would  depend  on  the  capital
intensity  of  such  infrastructure.  In  early  stages  of development,  this  would  mean
investments in electricity, transportation and other heavy infrastructure,  financial support
would in principle be prolonged.  But in later stages of development,  much of support
would be directed towards research and development as well as education and training
and  this  would  not require  as large  outlays  of capital  as the development  of public
utilities.
Two empirical  studies  have been  undertaken recently  that lend  support  to  the argument  that
Japanese policy-based finance was effective in meeting its objectives of "pump priming" and "crowding
in"  private  credit  for  growing  firms iri industries that  benefit from dynamic  comparative advantage.
Horiuchi  and  Sui  (1993) compared  the  investment behavior  of  "medium-size"  firms  receiving  JDB
assistance with other firms of similar size over the period 1964-1988.  They found that the year of initial
JDB lending was associated with increased investment and also that within three  years firms began to
move away from reliance on JDB lending to rely more on private banks.  Horiuchi and Sui also found
that directed credit was more effective for firms that did not have main bank affiliations.
Calomiris and Himmelberg (1994b) examined the effect of policy-based finance over the period
1963-1991 for the machine tool iiidustry, an industry selected for its high potential for spillover effects
due  to  technological  innovation  and  learning.  Machine  tool  producers  underwent  considerable
consolidation during the 1960s and 1970s, which was associated with the introduction of new technologies
and the achievement of unusually large economies of scale.
Their study is based on firm level data collected with the support of the Japan Development Bank.
The dataset covgrs only surviving firms and excludes firms that exited during the period.  This makes
the  identification of positive  effects from policy-based finance more difficult,  particularly  during  the
consolidation phase of the 1960s and 1970s when less productive firms exited or were merged with other
firms.
The  level of investment undertaken  by  machine tool producers  declined  over the  period.  It
averaged 27% of capital from 1965 to 1974 but fell to  10% from  1975 to 1991.  Similarly, total long-
term debt fell relative to capital from 41 % prior to 1975 to 26% afterwards.  Directed credit was a small
proportion of total long-term credit.  Total government credit fell from an average of 3 % of capital prior
to 1978 to 1  % after the mid-1  980s or from over 7% of all long-term credit td less than 4%.
A comparison of lending to general machinery producers by JDB with private long-term lenders
as well as with the Export-Import  Bank of Japan provides some interesting insights.  JDB lending to
15general  machinery  producers  declined from  between 3.7%  and 5.3%  of capital in the  late  1960s to
between  1.7%  and 3.5%  in the 1970s and between 0.8%  and 2.6%  in the 1980s.  This shows a clear
declining  trend  in JDB support  consistent with the premise  that government  credit  relaxed borrowing
constraints  and helped firms to become seasoned credit risks.  Credit from the Industrial Bank of Japan
to general machinery producers ranged  between 5.8%  and  8.9%  of capital in the late  1960s, between
6.0%  and  8.7%  in the  1970s and between 4.0%  and 6.6%  in the  1980s.  Thus,  despite the growing
recourse  of Japanese firms  to  the  euromarkets  in the  1980s,  their  reliance  on  IBJ funding  did not
experience the same decline as that on JDB.  In contrast to the JDB pattern, borrowing from the Export
Import Bank of Japan  registered a large increase from between 0.4%  and 0.9%  of capital in the  1960s
to between 3.0%  and  6.0%  in the  1970s and  between 3.8%  and  19.9%  in the  1980s.  The growing
reliance on EXIM loans must be associated with the maturity of the industry and the greater part played
by  exports  and  perhaps  also  overseas  operations  in  the  more  recent  period.  Thus,  support  from
government sources showed considerable flexibility and adaptation in line with changes in the structure
and orientation of the industries and firms that received government credit support.  Similar patterns are
also observed for the other types of machine tool producers.
Calomiris and  Himmelberg found that there was no capture of government funds either  at the
industry or at the firm level.  Directed credit was usually provided to a firm only once and it lasted for
a brief period (80% of firms received credit only once and the average credit spell was less than 8 years).
They  also found  that government credit  was provided to growing,  large,  capital intensive firms with
higher investment rates.  Moreover,  directed credit  appeared to bolster  the positive characteristics  of
recipient firms and thus to reinforce the process of consolidation,  investment and technological change
of the firms to which government credit was targeted.  Government credit also had a significant, positive
impact on investment and was positively correlated with private credit" 2.
Over the whole sample period,  a 100 yen government loan produced a 60 yen investment.  The
effect of JDB credit was even stronger  as a  100 yen JDB loan led to  150 yen investment and to 44 yen
long-term loans from private sources.  The effect of credit from JDB was larger and more significant
during  the  1970s and  1980s, while in the  1960s credit  from  other government  agencies  was equally
responsible for  the overall  effect of government credit.  A possible explanation may  be a change  in
lending policy by other government lenders in the 1980s away from producers with high growth potential.
12  The results reported in Calomiris and Himmelberg (1994b) were weaker than those reported  in
an earlier paper (Calomiris and Himmelberg 1994a)  that focused on the period 1982-91. The main reason
for the weaker results seems to be the use of a different methodology in conducting the empirical tests.
But another reason may be a selection bias in the larger sample covering the longer period as firms that
exited in the  1960s and  1970s are not included in the dataset that basically includes surviving firms.  If
exiting firms were  low-investment, poor-performance firms while surviving firms were more  likely to
receive government credit,  then the effect of government credit would be under-estimated.  In addition,
accounting data for the earlier years are probably less reliable.
16C.  CREDIT  POLICY  IN KOREA  '3
1.  Objectives
Korean experiences  are different from Japanese  experiences  in several respects. Unlike Japan,
credit policy in Korea involved  significant  subsidization  of the cost of borrowing. The coverage of the
programs also was much more extensive. The programs  heavily involved  commercial  banks as well as
development  banks.  Both types of banks were owned by the government  and were directed to channel
their loans to priority sectors.  An important feature of credit policy was the coercive nature of
government intervention as firms with minimum equity funds were encouraged to enter particular
industries, with a strong package of tax and financial incentives.  The government also had strong
leverage  toward firms through its control over the banking system as additional  credit could be denied
to, or existing  credit withdrawn  from, faltering  firms.
The operation of credit policy in Korea has also gone through three distinct phases:
In the 1950s  and 1960s,  credit policy was oriented toward particular activities, mainly
exports and industrial investment.
*  In the 1970s during the drive for the development  of heavy and chemical industries
(HCI), credit policy became  more geared  toward promoting  specific industries.  During
the HCI drive, the Korean authorities  relied heavily on their control of the entire credit
system and provided "strategic"  industries  preferential  access  at substantially  subsidized
rates.  The use of policy-based  loans was pervasive.
*  The successes  and failures of the HCI drive induced  a change in government  approach
in  the  1980s.  First,  the authorities became involved in  industrial and  financial
restructuring  of industrial  sectors and companies  in distress. As in Japan, Korean credit
(and industrial)  policy  started  to be preoccupied  not only with "picking  winners"  but also
with "phasing  out losers". Second, the focus  of policy  was reoriented  towards  producing
a  more balanced industrial sector that would not be dominated by a few business
conglomerates. As a result, lending to small and medium-size  firms received greater
attention. And credit policy  was reoriented  toward functional  activities  such as research
and development  and equipment  investment.
1  3  This section draws on Cho (1989), Cho and Kim (1994), Vittas and Wang (1991), and World
Bank (1987).
172.  Evolution of Policies
Directed credit  programs  adjusted flexibly to meet the business sector's  needs  following close
consultation with industrial leaders.  New credit programs  were created to channel financial resources
toward new industrial qpportunities while old programs were de-emphasized.
In the early 1960s, the government undertook a series of measures to strengthen state control over
finance: it nationalized the commercial banks and amended the central bank act to subordinate the Bank
of Korea to  the government.  Interest  rate reform,  implemented in  1965, doubled  the level of bank
interest rates and resulted in rapid growth of deposits in the government-controlled banks, shifting funds
from the informal credit market.  But it also enabled the government to enhance the scope of its control
over the allocation of financial resources as the funds shifted from the unregulated to the regulated sector.
Credit supports in the  1960s were structured toward promoting exports without much sectoral
bias.  In terms of the level of interest rates and the degree of credit control,  credit policies in the 1960s
(take-off stage) were n') more  pervasive th,an  those of 1950s.  The difference was in the way in which
the policies were used and managed.  In the 1950s, they were often used without clear industrial policy
goals.  In contrast,  in the 1960s, they were structured toward providing export support  and they were
better linked with other policy measures.
Furthermore, the government initiated close consultatipns with the business sector and moniotoed
very  closely the  performance  of  supported  firms.  The  "Monthly  Export  Promotion  Meetings"  and
"Monthly Briefings on Economic Trends,"  which were chaired by the President, constituted a forum both
among  ministries  and  between the  government  and the private  sector.  In these meetings,  progress
towards  achieving policy goals was closely monitored and consensus could be reached on how to deal
with emerging problems.  Economic management resembled that of a major corporation.  The banks were
effectively used as a treasury unit,  the industrial sector as the production and marketing units,  and the
government  as the  central  planning and  control  unit.  Korean credit  policy  thus  resembled  internal
transactions of an organization.
In the  1970s, with the drive for development of heavy and chemical industries (HCls),  credit
policies were geared toward supporting HCI investment.  In thp 1980s, the government intended to reduce
policy interventions in the credit market but, in practice, it continued to intervene as it was forced to be
involved in the restructuring of industrial firms facing financial difficulties, because of overexpansion in
the late 1970s and the collapse of foreign market3 (in shipping, shipbuilding and construction) in the early
1980s.  Government  had  become  entangled  in  a  vicious  intervention  circle.  But  with  political
democratization  in  the late  1980s, the structure  of directed  credit  programs  changed,  giving  greater
emphasis to social programs and the redistribution of income.
183.  The Size, Structure,  and Sources  of Policy Loans
In Korea, the share of policy loans in the total funds mobilized by the financial system was
substantial. It was about  half of total credit by domestic  financial  institutions  in the 1970s,  but gradually
decreased to about 30 percent of total credit as nonbank financial institutions, which were free from
policy loans, expanded  in the 1980s. However,  for deposit  money  banks (DMBs),  policy loans accounted
for about 60 percent of their total loans throughout  the period.
Policy loans were extended  mainly to the manufacturing  sector in the 1960s and 1970s. As a
result, in 1970 and 1980 for example,  the manufacturing  sector received  46 percent and 54 percent of
total bank loans while the service sector received  only 29 percent and 24 percent respectively.  The
manufacturing  sector's share in total bank credit was more than twice its share in GDP, while the share
of the service sector was only about 60 percent of its share in GDP. Among manufacturing  industries,
export and heavy and chemical industries  received  more credit than domestic sector and light industries
compared  to their share in GDP.
A significant  difference  of selective  credit policy in Korea from that of Japan lies in the source
of policy loans. Korea  has depended  heavily  on central  bank credit and deposits  mobilized  by commercial
banks, and much less on fiscal funds or funds mobilized  through government, such as postal savings.
Japan has mainly depended on fiscal funds and postal savings.  In Korea, among total policy loans
extended  by commercial  banks, only 7 to 8 percent  were financed  by fiscal  funds. On the contrary, about
35 percent of total policy loans by commercial  banks were financed  through central bank credit.  The
central bank's discount policy has been the major tool for guiding commercial  bank loans to strategic
sectors.  Policy  directed loans in Korea have relied heavily on money creation  and this is probably  the
main reason why Korea has had less price stability than Japan.
4.  The Role of Foreign Capital
Many observers  overlook  the role of foreign  capital  in shaping  the economic  policies, including
financial sector policies, and the development  course of Korea.  Foreign capital made a big difference
in Korean  economic  development,  because  domestic  savings  were far below  the desired  investment  levels.
The average economic  growth rate during 1962-82  was 8.2 percent.  According  to a rough estimate, if
investment  had totally depended  on domestic savings, the average growth rate during the same period
might have been only 4.9 percent.  This indicates  that the high Korean economic  growth was possible
through heavy  reliance  on foreign  savings. Without  ready  access  to foreign  capital,  Korea could  not have
continued  its repressive  financial  policies, which  limited  the mobilization  of financial  resources,  or might
have ended  up with a much lower rate of economic  growth.
As with domestic credit, foreign loan allocation  was also tightly controlled  by the government
to support industrial policy goals.  All foreign loans had to be authorized  by the government  and their
19allocation was determined following the industrial policy goals.  In 1965, the government revised the
Foreign Capital Inducement Act to allow the government-controlled banks to provide guarantees for the
repayment of foreign borrowing  by firms,  which facilitated inflows of foreign  capital and technology.
This, however, also caused the continuation of government intervention in the banks.  The external shock
to domestic firms,  which made it difficult for them to meet their foreign debt service,  often had to be
absorbed through  rescheduling of domestic bank loans since the default of foreign  loans could lead to
major disruption  in financing development projects.  The cost of government intervention in domestic
banks in turn had to be shared by depositors.
5.  Policy Effectiveness
The effectiveness of credit policies for economic growth can be evaluated in two broad aspects:
first,  their contribution  to the growth of industries or sectors through the cost subsidies and favorable
access  to  capital;  and  second,  their  contribution  to  industrialization  through  motivating  private
entrepreneurship  by the provision  of government's  risk partnership to the private sector.
Available data indicate that Korean credit policies were effective in reducing the cost of funds and
enhancing access to funds by priority sectors.  The export oriented firms enjoyed greater access to credit
and lower borrowing costs than domestic oriented firms.  HCIs also enjoyed greater access to credit than
light manufacturing industry.  Despite its high risk, the borrowing cost of HCI was significantly  lower
than that of light industry, owing to large credit supports,  including various policy loans.  In general, it
is assessed that this helped the rapid expansion of these sectors, especially in their take-off stage.
However,  the  above evidence does not necessarily  imply  that selective credit  supports  were
essential  for  rapid economic growth since it is very difficult to estimate the opportunity  cost of such
supports.  For this, a general equilibrium analysis would be required.  But in Korea,  since substantial
parts  of input  and  output prices were  controlled  in the early  stages of development,  even a  general
equilibrium analysis would face severe limitations.  At the same time,  it is too early  to provide  a full
answer to this  question,  since Korean economic development  is still in progress,  and the cost of past
financial policies may not have been fully realized.
In the case of export growth,  there seems to be little controversy that it was the main engine of
growth in Korea in the  1960s and  1970s.  To the extent that credit support was indispensable for export
growth,  which seems  to have been the case, credit  support  must have contributed to rapid  economic
growth,  although  there remain doubts as to whether a large  subsidy was necessary to kick-off export
growth.  In the case of the HCI drive, however,  its effect on growth remains controversial.  Although
the credit  supports contributed  to the rapid development  of HCI,  credit  might  have been  used more
efficiently  if its  allocation was better  balanced between the  HCI  and light  industry,  given  the  labor
endowment in the 1970s.  But the HCls became the leading export industry in Korea starting in the mid-
1980s.  It could be arpoied that if the HCI drive had not taken place in the 1970s, Korea might not have
20been able to take full advantage of the appreciation of the Japanese yen and world economic boom in the
second half of 1980s.  No solid answer can be provided to this question.
The impact of credit policies on industrialization is not limited to its impact on the cost and access
to  credit.  In  an  economy  like  Korea,  where  the  initial  capital  accumulation  was  poor  and  rapid
investment  growth had  to be  financed  mainly  by  bank  credits  and foreign  loans,  firms had  highly
leveraged financial structures.  In such a credit-based economy, financial crises would have occurred with
major  economic  downturns  unless  some  risk  sharing schemes  between the  creditors  and  borrowers
existed.  By controlling finance, the Korean government could become an effective risk-sharing partner
with industrialists and could thus motivate their risk venture and entrepreneurship.  It could induce the
industrialists to have long-term horizons in their business.  In other words,  by controlling finance, the
government established an implicit government-industry-bank co-insurance scheme. Without such implicit
risk partnership,  Korea might not have been able to establish large industrial firms with  international
standing within such a short period of time.  This indirect impact of the government credit policies may
have  been  a  more  important  factor  than  the  credit  subsidies  as  such  for  explaining  the  rapid
industrialization of Korea.
6.  The Cost and Legacy of Credit Policies
Control over finance strengthened the government's hand for implementing industrial policy, and
helped foster  the quick establishment of industrial firms with international reputations. But this was not
costless.
Several commentators have argued that the credit policies pursued during the HCI drive were very
costly and that the HCI drive was overambitious and resulted in serious misallocation of resources.  The
preferred  sectors expanded production capacity too rapidly,  while firms did not have sufficient time to
accumulate experience and digest new technologies.  The resulting low quality products  could not be
exported and most firms were characterized by excess capacity, high production costs and low product
quality.  The unsupported sectors were forced to borrow at very high rates from the informal sector and
the dual nature of the credit system created a major imbalance in the industrial structure of the country
(Koo 1984, Kwak 1984).
As Korea relied on credit interventions too heavily and for too long as an instrument of industrial
policy, the costs were born heavily by banking institutions and depositors.  Commercial banks in Korea
were involved so heavily in directed credit programs that they almost functioned as development banks.
In the process  their management efficiency and quality of services were sacrificed. They also had large
volumes of non-performing loans.  NBFIs, which operated more freely, expanded rapidly and superseded
the banks'  share  in  the  financial intermediation  market.  To  some  extent,  the expansion  of  NBFIs
contributed to improvement  of financial market operations by keeping competitive  forces alive in the
financial system, which would otherwise have been overly repressed.
21The problem  of moral hazard for commercial banks has been no less serious.  As long as the
government was willing to rescue firms, banks did not have to pay much attention to screening projects
and  monitoring  the  firrns.  The government-supported  firms became  too  large  and  dominant  to  go
bankrupt.  Large financial support was given to ailing firms or industrial sectors in the mid-1980s when
many individual firms and business groups suffered heavy losses from excess capacity and the collapse
of export markets  in the aftermath of the second oil  shock and the worldwide  recession  of the  early
1980s,  although detailed  data on  this are not readily available.  These problems  made it increasingly
difficult for the government to break out of the vicious circle of financial repression.  When the expansion
of  the  Korean  economy  and  increasing  sophistication of  the  industrial  structure  called for  a  more
innovative and market-oriented  financial sector,  the past legacy became a constraint for liberalization.
As  the  industrial  policy  emphasized  the  economies  of  scale  to  maintain  international
competitiveness,  it  led  to  overwhelming  economic  concentration  within  the  Chaebols.  It  was  not
uncommon for the Chaebols to triple the number of their affiliates with new acquisitions in heavy and
chemical sectors during  the period of the HCI drive.  In the face of growing public discontent against
excessive economic concentration, the government had to redirect policies to emphasize the redistribution
of income, which often involved increased regulation on the business activities of large firms.
D.  CREDIT  POLICY  IN CHINA  14
Budgetary allocation of all  financial resources  can be regarded  as an extreme  form of policy
lending  under  the  planning  system.  Since China  relied  heavily  on  budgetary  funds  to  finance  its
investment and production  before and during the early period of the recent reform,  policy lending was
one of the main instruments of financing China's  economic growth and development.
The rise of the more market-oriented non-state economic sectors has reduced the importance of
policy directed lending for China's  overall economic growth and development.  Policy directed lending
has evolved into a vehicle for financing a few shrinking or stagnant state sectors and of supporting price
control in farm and export-import products.  New firms in the private sector in the economic zones have
been financed by large inflows of overseas capital, especially form the Chinese diaspora.
Policy loans certainly contributed to a gradual and orderly transition of the Chinese economy.
In particular,  policy directed lending played an important role in cross-subsidizing key state supported
investment projects and price control schemes in farm and export-import products.  But, the growth and
productivity  performance of priority  sectors were poor.  Also, many policy loans were either  diverted
or turned into bad loans.
14  This section draws on Xiao and Xu (1993).
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underdevelopment  of the private financial  institutions,  the immaturity of the financial  markets, the rapid
growth of market-oriented  economic  activities, and the considerable  decentralization  of decision-making
power from the central government to local governments and local financial institutions.  Central
government found it very difficult and costly to monitor closely the waste and diversion of financial
resources to priority sectors.
Policy directed  lending was closely  associated  with excessive  credit expansion  during the reform
period. The priority loans became  one of the major channels  for expansion  of central  bank credit, which
then generated  excessive  credit expansion  in the economy. In recent years, about one third of total bank
credit was allocated for policy-based  lending  and most of it was financed by central bank credit.  Most
priority borrowers benefitted from negative real interest rates.  Moreover, banks often operated with
negative spreads.  Sometimes, the banks were compensated  by transfers from the budget, but in other
cases, they absorbed the negative spreads.  This approach created inflationary pressures and price
instability similar to those experienced  by Korea in the 1960s  and 1970s.
Policy directed lending in China  had a very significant  indirect impact on non-priority  sectors
through excessive  credit expansion  and distorted  implementation  of policy loans.  For example,  the rural
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) were not a priority sector and received very few subsidized
loans. Nevertheless,  TVEs have  expanded  very rapidly through  both self-financing  and heavy  borrowing
from the banking system. The ratio of the loans to TVEs over the total state bank loans increased from
2.2% in 1979 to 6.1% in 1984 and 8.5% in 1991.  The rapid growth of non-priority sectors such as
TVEs increased the supply of goods and services  and reduced  the inflationary  pressure rooted in credit
expansion.
Policy directed lending has now become a crucial issue for China's macroeconomic  stability,
financial  sector reform as well as economic  transition in general. The issue of policy lending  is closely
related to a number of important economic  problems: the future of the loss-making  large state-owned
enterprises; the growth of non-state enterprises; the stability of farm production and marketing; the
stability of exchange rates; and the general price level.
E.  CREDIT  POLICY  IN INDIA  15
During the last few decades,  India  has experienced  rapid  financial  deepening. Owing  to its stable
macroeconomic  environmnent,  it now has an impressive  financial  system, which ranks in the top quarter
among  the financial  sectors of most developing  countries. Until  the liberalization  of the financial  system
in 1991, one of the key policy instruments  used to steer the financial  sector was the directed  credit policy
15  This section draws on Madhur (1993).
23of the government.  Allocation of a significant  proportion of the financial sector funds was done by
government  directives  at administered  interest rates.
In India, 90% of the commercial  banking  sector  was under state-ownership. Commercial  banks
were required  to invest 15  % of their funds in cash to fulfil the cash reserve requirement  and an additional
38% in government  and government-approved  securities. By the end of 1991, 63.5  % of the increase in
bank deposits had to be invested in government  and government-approved  securities.  Interest rates on
these securities were pegged  below market levels. In addition, 40% of the remaining funds (i.e. nearly
19% of their total funds) were required to be lent at somewhat  concessional  rates to priority sectors.
Thus, more than 70% of the funds of commercial  banks were subject to government direction. Of the
remaining  funds, banks were expected  to meet the credit requirements  of exporters at concessional  rates
and the buffer-stocking  operations of the government in food grains.  Export credit and food credit
constituted  respectively  about 4 % and 1  % of total funds, thus leaving less than 25 % for lending at the
discretion  of the banks.
Nonbank  financial  intermediaries,  which  included  cooperative  banks, postal  savings, development
banks, provident funds, insurance companies and unit trusts, were also required to invest a sizable
proportion of their funds in government securities or in approved loans.  Statutory investments and
priority credits amounted in total to about 50% of all funds mobilized by the financial system.  The
interest rate subsidy, calculated as a differential from the banks' prime rate, ranged between 3% for
government  securities and 5% for agricultural  loans.
Unlike  in Japan and Korea, where cirected credit policy was aimed at channelling  funds to large
industrial  firms, the key objective  of directed  credit policy  in India was  to channel  resources to what were
considered socially desirable sectors and weaker sections of the. population - such as agriculture,
small-scale  industrial units, and poorer households. State enterprises  also benefitted  from the capture  of
large funds for government use through the statutory investment requirements.  On a  balance of
considerations,  it appears that directed credit policy had mixed results in achieving  its objectives. The
increased  flow of credit to the priority sectors  benefitted  them in that it generally  had positive effects  on
investment,  output, employment  and incomes  of these sectors.  However, these achievements  were not
costless.
While solving some of the old problems,  such as high concentration  of credit in large business
houses and its inadequate  availability  to other productive  sectors, directed  credit policy gave rise to new
problems. The most important  of these  problems  was the  substantial  cross-subsidization  of directed  credit
by the medium and large industrial sector.  Beyond a certain limit, such cross-subsidization  led to
unsustainably  high interest rates on industrial finance.
24IV.  ECONOMIC  AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
FOR SUCCESSFUL CREDIT POLICIES 16
The list of theoretical arguments and practical considerations set out in the introductory sections
of this paper suggest that credit policy could be an effective policy instrument for economic development.
The question then arises  why did credit policies fail in so many countries around the world and what
factors explain their relative success in East Asian countries.
The  experience  of  East  Asia  shows  that  both  economic  and  institutional  factors  are  very
important.  Economic factors  include the maintenance of macroeconomic stability, export orientation,
domestic competition, reliance on private sector, and bias toward industrialization.  Institutional factors
cover the creation of effective monitoring systems,  the use of extensive consultation arrangements and
the development and propagation of credible visions.
A.  ECONOMIC  FACTORS
Macroeconomic Stability.  Most East  Asian countries  were able to maintain macroeconomic
stability, with small exceptions now and then.  Macroeconomic stability in itself does not, however, seem
to be a sufficient condition.  Several other countries in other parts of the world, such as the Middle East
and North Africa, Southern Europe,  and South Asia, also avoided the high inflation rates of some Latin
American and African countries.  For instance, India maintained better price stability than Korea.  Yet
neither their economic performance nor their credit policies were as successful as those of Japan and other
East Asian countries.  Nevertheless, macroeconomic stability seems to be very important for encouraging
the growth of financial savings.  India and other countries with moderate inflation, compared to other
developing countries with similar level of per capita income, experienced substantial deepening of their
financial sector.  Japan, whose macroeconomic environment was very stable, also experienced steady and
rapid growth of its financial system.  Korea, on the other hand, had relatively high inflation and poor
growth of financial sector in the 1970s, although its experience was reversed in the 1980s.  The recent
rapid  growth  of holdings  of  findncial assets  in  China,  Where the  macroeconomic  environment  was
relatively stable compared to other developing countries, also supports the importance of price stability.
Competitive Product Market Environment and  Export Orientation.  The main  difference
between  the  high  performing  East  Asian  economies  and  other  countries  lied  in  the  fact  that
macroeconomic stability in East Asia was combined with intense domestic competition,  strong export
orientation,  and  reliance  on  the  private  sector.  In Japan  and  Korea,  although  there  were  import
protection,  strong competition prevailed in the domestic niarket among large industrial firms.  Even in
the economically stable countries of Middle East and North Africa,  Southern Europe, and South Asia
Ih  6  This  section draws on  JDB/JERI (1994), Cho and Hellmann (1993), and Vittas and Kawaura
(1994).industrial production was often oriented toward the domestic market, was sheltered from both domestic
and  foreign  competition, and  was in the hands of state-owned enterprises.  Export-orientation  forced
domestic firms in Japan, Korea and other East Asian countries to be internationally competitive and attain
high levels of efficiency.  The strong export orientation also provided objective criteria for  monitoring
the performance of individual firms and assessing the effectiveness of credit support.  For example, good
performers  in  export  markets  implied  continuing  access to  policy-based  finance.  Product  market
competition and the link between market performance and credit support limited the risk of government
failure.  In India and other developing economies, import substitution policies and monopolies of public
firms  limited domestic  competition.  The  latter  enjoyed  economic  rents  and  were  often  the  major
recipients of credit supports for industrial development.
Effective Policy Coordination.  The goals of credit policies were narrowly  focussed and they
were well coordinated with other policies.  In Japan and Korea,  the main goals of credit policies were
industrialization and export promotion.  Other policy measures, such as foreign exchange, tax, and fiscal
policies, were also geared toward these same goals.  In Japan the allocation of foreign exchange, and in
Korea the approval of foreign loans, were coordinated with domestic credit policies to support effectively
the industrial policy goals.  In contrast, credit policies in India, for example, focussed on redistribution
of income and wealth, with large emphasis on small farmers and firms.  Therefore,  credit programs to
support  manufacturing and exports were largely offset by  the emphasis on  redistribution.  This often
resulted in implicit taxation of large industries to support farmers and small business as was mentioned
above.
B.  INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
Successful management of credit policies depends crucially on institutional arrangements.  These
include  effective  monitoring  systems,  extensive  consultation  arrangements  and  credible  visions.
Institutional factors have
Effective Monitoring Systems.  Reference has already been made above to the effectiveness of
monitoring  in Japan  and  Korea.  Loan  approval  was preceded  by  careful  design  and  independent
appraisal, while monitoring of fund utilization was very strict.  Fund disbursement was based on adequate
documentation.  Moreover,  continued access to policy-based loans depended on attainment of objective
targets, mostly in internationally competitive export markets.
The  importance  of  this  factor  cannot  be  overemphasized  since  what  matters  for  economic
development  is  not  really  the  mobilization  and  allocation  of  financial  resources  but  their  efficient
utilization.  After all, any country can mobilize resources by printing money which can then be allocated
to priority  sectors.  Although such money creation will increase inflationary pressures,  if the resources
are utilized  well and lead to higher and more efficient levels of production,  unit costs may be lowered
and may offset the inflationary impact of monetary financing of development.
26Effective  Consultation and  Coordination Arrangements.  Participatory government
intervention,  based on government-led  internal  organizations  (GLIOs), such as the deliberative  councils
and numerous industrial associations  that characterize  Japan and Korea as well as other East Asian
countries, can play an important  part in avoiding  the pitfalls  of credit policies  (such as adverse  selection,
moral hazard and low recovery rates) and ensuring the allocation  of scare resources to activities with
positive externalities  and long-term benefits. Both Japan and Korea developed  effective networks that
contributed to the relative success of their credit policies.  In contrast, such organizations  have been
largely absent in China and India.
Government-led  internal  organizations  provide  an improved  mechanism  for risk-sharing  with the
providers  of finance, resulting  from the backing  of governments  for preferred activities. In addition, they
may overcome to some extent the uncertainty  facing particular firms through the implicit or explicit
commitment  of governments  to particular  enterprises. Through  monthly  economic  briefing  meetings  and
deliberative  councils, they may also stimulate  the collection  and exchange  of information  and facilitate
more effective  monitoring.  Through these arrangements,  governments  promote consensus  among the
different participants  not only through moral suasion  but also through the provision of direct incentives
(both "sticks" and "carrots")  to achieve  cooperation  and coordination. However, such organizations  are
confronted  with risks of moral hazard, manipulation  and inefficient  implementation. They can improve
the allocation  of credit over market solutions only if there are strong safeguards  against abuse.
Credible Visions. A very important  factor  behind  the success  of credit policies in East Asia was
the ability of government agencies to implement  policy, appraise projects, monitor performance and
ensure compliance. The fact that policies  were designed  in extensive  and effective  consultations  with the
private sector facilitated  their acceptance  and stimulated  cooperation  in their implementation. However,
an important  factor also was the existence  of credible  visions  about  the goals and instruments  of industrial
policy.
Economists have generally paid little attention to the importance of credible and consistent
visions.  These are not equivalent to detailed quantitative  plans but are rather concerned  about broad
aspects  of strategy.  Although it is difficult  to generalize  for all East Asian countries, the visions with
regard to industrial policy seem to have included  the following:
*  A clear priority of industrialization  and economic  development  ahead of financial  sector
development. Most statements  of Japanese  officials implied that industrialization  and
economic growth took precedence  over the development  of an efficient and modern
financial sector.  To be sure, the authorities were committed to ensure the safety of
deposits and the solvency  of financial intermediaries  but were less concerned to allow
banks and other financial  intermediaries  to innovate  and develop  new services  aiming at
reducing  the cost of financial  intermediation.  There  were many  controls  on bank spreads
and  interest rates,  on  branching and  bank mergers, and  on  bond issues, while
27administrative guidance discouraged lending for consumer credit and housing finance and
encouraged the creation of large industrial/financial groupings.  The promotion of bank-
centered groups encouraged close links between banks and their industrial customers and
facilitated the close  monitoring of the performance  of industrial companies.  In fact,
government financial institutions relied to a significant extent on the short-term  and day-
to-day monitoring of industrial firms by their commercial banks.
*  Encouragement of industries, such as steel,  oil refining, petro-chemicals,  automobiles,
aircraft, industrial machinery of all sorts, and electronics, including electronic computers,
where  income elasticity of demand is high,  technological progress  is rapid,  and  labor
productivity  rises fast.  The strategy emphasized dynamic comparative advantage rather
than stalic cost considerations (Ojimi  1972, Johnson 1982, Yotopoulos  1991).
*  The  emphasis  on  complementarities  in production  for  both  the domestic  and  export
markets, which supported the income doubling plan of Japan in the 1960s as well as the
Korean HCI drive in the late 1970s.  Promoting both exports and domestic sales allowed
a shift of resources to exports when problems  in the international balance of payments
forced the government to curtail domestic demand.  But when the problems of paying for
imported raw materials eased, the focus was shifted on expanding sales at home.  If this
could be achieved, factories could keep operating throughout all phases of the business
cycle and  could thus achieve a  higher scale  of production  and  lower  operating  costs
(Johr;son 1982, Yotopoulos 1991).
*  A continuous shifting in the focus of industrial policy.  This was more pronounced  in
Japan but was also evident in Korea and other East Asian countries.  In Japan, industrial
strategy first emphasized the recovery of priority production, then the modernization of
equipment in heavy industries, and then the development of new industrial sectors with
high  potential  externalities,  such  as  the machine  tools  industry.  The  strategy  also
included the smooth adjustment of declining industries and covered the restructuring of
companies that faced difficulties and the rationalization of whole sectors of industry that
suffered  from  overcapacity.  Finally,  with  the  achievement  of  high  levels  of
industrialization, the focus changed to improving the quality of life, with more spending
on  the  environment  and  pollution  control,  housing,  and  other  social  infrastructure
projects.
*  The adoption of credible visions also had implications for policy-based finar,ce.  Credit
policies were only one of the industrial policy instruments.  Although Japanese and other
East Asian officials often emphasized the superiority of policy-based finance over direct
budget subsidies and grants in promoting industrialization, they also made extensive use
of other  instruments,  such as accelerated depreciation allowances and  tax-free special
28reserves.  These allowed profitable and successful firms in the promoted sectors to retain
and reinvest a larger part of their profits than firms in nontargeted sectors.  Particularly
important because of its link with the overall strategy  of export promotion  and export
push  ware  the  special reserves  that were  linked to past  export  performance.  These
noncredit-based incentives reinforced the impact of credit policies and helped to stress the
credibility of the programs.
*  The existence of a coherent and credible vision also lent credibility to the consultation
processes and deliberative  councils.  Many  other countries around  the world  tried  to
promote close consultation between government and the private sector but, in the absence
of a coherent vision, such exchanges became little more than forums for special pleading
or ineffective talk shops.
*  A  very  important  contribution  of government  in some East  Asian countries  was the
compilation and dissemination of information about longer term sectoral prospects,  an
activity that is not readily undertaken by the private sector and private securities markets
where there is greater emphasis on collection of data with short-term payoffs (e.g.  price
discovery in futures markets).  Again the existence of a credible vision and the carrot and
stick approach that were used to  encourage cooperation  resulted in the collection and
analysis  of broadly  reliable  data  about the prospects  of particular  industrial  sectors.
These reinforced the sighalling effect of policy-based finance and encouraged commercial
banks to provide additional financial support to companies that received credit assistance
from government financial institutions.
T'he existence of a coherent and credible vision did not imply that it was inspired and  imposed
by government bureaucrats on an unwilling private sector.  On the contrary, rnost studies of Japanese and
East Asian  finance and industrial policy emphasize the close links and extensive consultation  between
bureaucrats and representatives of the private sector'7. Proof that the strategic vision was not imposed
from above is provided in Japan by the few examples where bureaucrats were perceived to have gone too
far and the business sector fought successfully against the adoption of particular laws.  Perhaps the best
example is  provided by  the defeat  of the  1963 draft  law  on  Special Measures  for  the Promotion  of
Designated Industries, which was rejected because of opposition to granting explicit draconian controls
to MITI officials (Johnson 1982).
17  Ohmae (1982) went further and argued that there was extensive cooperation and cohesion between
corporate managers and workers.  He pointed out that in Japan a corporation was seen as an assembly
of people,  each known  as a member  (not an employee).  He also  stressed the importance of primary
education and the role of the government as coach, not captain.
29Credible  and coherent  strategic visions also existed in Korea,  Singapore and other East  Asian
countries.  These are described and documented in the East Asian Miracle study (World Bank 1993).
Of course, the existence of grand visions does not necessarily imply that industrial and economic success
should be fully attributed to them.  In some cases, visions may have been too ambitious (e.g. Korea), in
others they may have been too diffuse (e.g. Thailand or Indonesia).  Moreover, visions and the industrial
policies they have embraced may turn out to involve significant long-term costs.  These are unlikely to
offset  the  benefits  of  higher  growth  or  to  undermine  the  achievements  of  industrialization  and
development,  but they are bound to lower the net benefits from this approach.
30V.  SUMMARY AND LESSONS
To summarize  and conclude  this paper, we first provide  a comparative  analysis  of credit policies
in  the four Asian countries under review and then list the main ingredients of  successful credit
interventions.
A.  COUNTRY  EXPERIENCE IN COMPARATIVE  PERSPECTIVE
The comparative  analysis  covers key aspects  of credit policies such as the scope and size of the
programs, the level of subsidies, the sources of funding, the types of implementing  institutions, the
quality of monitoring and supervision, the rate of loan recovery and loan losses, and the underlying
strategy and focus of credit policies.
Scope and Size. Of the four countries,  the scope of credit policies was more narrowly focused
in Japan,  even though it was targeted toward exports, large industry, declining sectors, and for
socioeconomic  purposes.  Except for the immediate  reconstruction  period, the size of directed credit
programs did not exceed 15% of the total funds mobilized  by the financial system.  Even if the funds
mobilized through the Bank of Japan's rediscounting  policies and the "overloan" position of large
commercial  banks are included, the total "directed"  credit funds did not exceed 20% of total financial
sector funds.  In Korea, directed credit programs were also heavily focused toward exports and large
industrial  units, although  in the 1980s  there was a shift in favor of lending  to smaller firms.  In Korea,
directed  credit programs were more extensive  than in Japan and amounted  to over 50% of total funds in
the 1970s, though they fell to around 30% of the total funds of the financial system in the 1980s
following  the rise in the relative share of finance  companies  and other nonbank financial  intermediaries.
In China, policy-based  lending  amounted  to about  a third of total bank credit. Credit allocation  continued
to be reminiscent  of budget  allocation  in a socialist  economy,  while  directed  credit programs were mainly
targeted  toward large state-owned  enterprises. In India,  directed  credit programs  covered  lending  to small
firms and rural farmers as well as the government  sector.  Over 70% of the resources of Indian
commercial  banks were subject to government  direction, while around 50% of the funds of the whole
financial  system were subject to statutory reserve  or priority credit requirements.
Level of Subsidy. Generally,  the level  of subsidy  was small in all four countries,  mainly  because
of their ability to maintain  relative  macroeconomic  and price stability. The level of subsidy  was  perhaps
largest in Korea and more recently  China where inflation  was on some occasions  too high.  It was also
very large in Japan in the high inflation  years of the late 1940s. In Japan, where policy-based  loans were
not subject to compensating  balances, the level of subsidy of borrowing from policy-based  financial
institutions  was greater than the reported  nominal  spread  between  interest  rates on policy-based  loans and
interest rates on other loans because  of the impact  of compensating  balances  on commercial  bank loans,
especially  for lending  to smaller firms. In Korea  and China, real interest rates paid  on policy-based  loans
31were often negative, though they did not reach the very low levels seen in many other developing
countries  that suffered from persistently  very high inflation.
Sources  of Funding.  The sources of funding in Japan after the implementation  of balanced
budgets and tight monetary  control in the late 1940s  were fiscal funds  based  on the mobilization  of postal
savings. In India, directed  credit programs  were also funded from savings  deposits  as well as long-term
contractual  savings. In these two countries,  central bank credit played  a relatively minor part, although
in Japan the central  bank rediscount  window  was occasionally  a major source of funds, especially  in the
1950s  and early 1960s,  to accommodate  the "overloan"  position  of the large commercial  banks. In Korea
and China, central bank credit was far more important  in funding  policy-based  loans and this contributed
to the higher rate of inflation  experienced  by these two countries. Foreign debt capital was an important
source of policy-based funds only in Korea, where the government encouraged recourse to foreign
borrowing  but subject  to strict controls  and direction. In China, inflows  of foreign  capital, mainly from
the Chinese  diaspora, supported  the operations  of new firms in the economic  zones. In Japan and India,
foreign  capital was a less important  source of funding, mainly because  of the desire  of the authorities  to
limit dependence  on fo.eign sources of capital.
Implementing  Institutions.  In Japan, the institutions  involved  in extending  policy-based  finance
were mainly the government  financial  institutions,  though the private long-term  credit banks also played
an important  part. Commercial  banks  provided  support for export  finance,  especially  through the central
bank's rediscount  window,  and were subject  to administrative  guidance  that favored  lending  to industry.
In contrast, in Korea, not only special  banks such as the Korea Development  Bank and the Export and
Import Bank of Korea, but also the commercial  banks, which were state-owned  and controlled, were
heavily involved  in policy-based  finance. The same was also true in India and China.
Monitoring  and Supervision. A distinguishing  feature of policy-based  finance in Japan and
Korea was the close degree  of monitoring  and supervision  of the allocation  and utilization  of preferential
funds. Both countries  promoted  close  consultation,  coordination  and information  exchange  between  the
govermment  and the private sector.  Loan approval was preceded by careful design and independent
appraisal.  Monitoring  of fund utilization  was very strict.  Fund disbursement  was based on adequate
documentation,  while continuation  of access  to policy-based  loans depended  on attainment  of objective
targets, mostly  in internationally  competitive  export  markets. In China,  monitoring  and supervision  were
much less effective, reflecting  in part the considerable  decentralization  of decision making  power away
from the central government to local governments  and local financial institutions.  This resulted in
considerable  diversion of funds to  nonpriority uses.  India also suffered from lax monitoring and
supervision.
Loan Recovery  and Loan Losses. Partly because  of stricter monitoring  and partly because  of
the achievement  of very high growth rates over a persistent  period, loan losses in Japan were unusually
low.  However, the reported very low loan loss rates may also be attributed to the absorption  by the
32general budget  of losses from lending  to declining  industries,  such as coal mining. In Korea, loan losses
were much higher, especially in connection  with the overambitious  expansion in heavy and chemical
industries. The costs of credit intervention  were borne by banking  institutions,  while  many  of these losses
have yet to fully recognized. In India,  there were substantial  problems with nonperforming  loans to state
enterprises as well as to rural farmers and small firms.  Similar problems also existed in China.
Strategy and  Focus.  Japan and Korea had  clearly formulated strategies for  supporting
industrialization and export promotion.  They both encouraged strong domestic competition and
production  at internationally  competitive  levels. Effective  mechanisms  were created  in both countries  for
communication  between  government  and industry, for establishing  common  goals, and for sharing risks.
In contrast, in China and India, state enterprises  faced  little domestic  competition  and domestic  enterprises
were shielded from international  competition  through high trade barriers.
B.  INGREDIENTS OF SUCCESSFUL  CREDIT  INTERVENTIONS
The studies undertaken  under this project support  the claim of Japanese, Korean and other East
Asian officials that  credit  policies can be  effective in  promoting industrialization and economic
development,  under certain circumstances.  Ten main lessons  can be drawn from the experience  of these
countries.  These can divided into two groups, those that reflect "good vision" and those that are
associated with "good management".
"Good  Vision"  Lessons:
1.  Credit programs must have a small size and a narrow focus and be of limited duration
with clear "sunset"  provisions.
2.  They must involve  a low level of subsidy to minimize  distortions in incentives  and also
to minimize  the tax  on financial  intermediation  that all credit programs necessarily  entail.
3.  They must be  financed by long-term funds to  avoid inflation and macroeconomic
instability. In particular,  recourse  to central  bank credit should  be avoided,  except in the
very early stage of development  when selective credit programs supported by central
bank credit might help  jump-start economic  growth and development. But even in these
cases, care must be taken to prevent high rates of inflation and loss of macroeconomic
stability.
4.  They should aim at achieving  positive externalities  (or avoiding negative  ones). Thus,
they should focus on overcoming  the external  finance constraint facing small or rapidly
expanding  firms as well as on financing  firms in declining  industries. In the latter case,
33credit programs  should be accompanied with clear plans to phase-out  in an orderly  and
timely fashion declining industries.
5.  They should promote  industrialization and export orientation and should be based on a
competitive private  sector with internationally competitive operations.
6.  They should form part of a broader credible vision of economric  development,  promoting
growth  with  equity,  and  involving a  long-term strategy  to  develop  a sound  financial
system operating  on economic criteria.
"Good  Management"  Lessons:
I1.  Policy-based loans should be channelled through well capitalized, administratively capable
and  autonomous  financial  institutions.  Professional  management  and  managerial
autonomy  are essential.
2.  They should be based on clear, objective and easily monitorable criteria.  Detailed project
appraisals,  close  supervision  of  disbursement,  and  monitoring  of  performance  and
repayment  records are key to the success of such programs.
3.  They  should aim for a good repayment record and low loan losses.
4.  They should be supported by effective mechanisms for communication and consultation
between the public and private sectors, including the collection of and dissemination of
basic market information.
Although  bearing  in mind these lessons is important,  it should be stressed  that replicating  the
Japanese and Korean experience may be more difficult in today's  financial environment.  The advent of
high  technology  coupled  with  the  globalization  of  financial markets  have  substantially  reduced  the
effectiveness  of  foreign  exchange controls  on  capital movements  and  have limited  the ability  of the
authorities to set interest rates at substantially below market levels.  Moreover, the use of credit policies
will become more  limited under  the new World Trade Organization.  But the greater  challenge facing
other developing  countries in using policy-based finance stems from the absence of the very institutional
factors ("good  vision" and  "good management") that explain the success of these policies in Japan and
Korea.
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